GEN 4963
Game Theory and Social Behavior
Stanford University · UGRD · Fall 2026
Catalog description
Game theory is the formal toolkit for analyzing situations in which payoffs depend not only on your actions (say, which TV series you watch), but also others' (whether your friends are watching the same show). You've probably already heard of some famous games, like the prisoners' dilemma and the costly signaling game. We'll teach you to solve games like these, and more, using tools like Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the one-off deviation principle. Game theory has traditionally been applied to understand the behavior of highly deliberate agents, like heads of state, firms in an oligopoly, or participants in an auction. However, we'll apply game theory to social behavior typically considered the realm of psychologists and philosophers, such as why we speak indirectly, in what sense beauty is socially constructed, and where our moral intuitions come from. Nearly each week, students are expected to complete a problem set, to read 2-3 academic papers, and to complete a 1-2 page response to short essay questions (`prompts') on these readings. All assignments can be completed in groups of two. There will also be a final exam. Prerequisites: Although there are no formal prerequisites for this course, we will make frequent use of probability theory (Bayes' Rule; conditional probabilities), set theory notation, and proofs. Students without a background in these tools have historically found some of the later problem sets to be challenging. TA sessions are not required, but are recommended for students without the necessary math background. Not sure if this class is for you? Take our self assessment, then see how your answers compare with ours. (Assessments and solutions can be found here: https://economics.stanford.edu/undergraduate/forms)
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