Seminar in Philosophy of Mind

Catalog description

The nature of the mind and its relation to the physical world is the focus of this course, which builds on its precursor ( PHIL 127 ). Topics include the definition of consciousness, what constitutes a self, and whether artificial constructions like robots could have minds. Views on these topics, as formulated by a range of (largely twentieth-century) movements - logical behaviorism, functionalism, (physicalist) reductionism, eliminativism, dualism, mind-brain identity theory, and enactivism - have significant metaphysical and ethical consequences. If consciousness is separate from the body, physical theories of causation cannot explain the effect of thought on action. If robots can have minds, there are reasons to be concerned about exploitation of robots as well as the possibility of robot domination. Students will investigate these topics in greater depth, typically either by selecting one or two for careful study or by focusing on the thought of one or two selected authors, e.g., Ryle, Smart, Millikan, Fodor, Block, Churchland, and Chalmers. Texts will challenge students to read and analyze contemporary and historical scholarly work on the topic. The issues discussed will encourage reflection on the assumptions students have about themselves and how their minds shape and are shaped by the world.